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 Abstract
“Exploitation” or free riding are names for strategies by which agents benefi t from other 
agents’ investments. This chapter reviews the consequences of these exploitative strate-
gies for individual behavior, social structure, and design of institutions. From an evolu-
tionary perspective, it begins by outlining how  natural selection should act to construct 
behavioral connections that maximize the benefi ts and minimize the costs of sociality 
for individuals. Individuals are predicted to show specifi c leaving or joining decision 
rules that will construct groups composed of complementary strategies; alternatively, 
they should be plastic in response to their social environment, which can lead to con-
ditional strategies and  social niche construction. What happens on an individual level 
impacts, in turn, social structures. When individuals have fewer or more frequent in-
teractions with a set of specifi c (known) individuals, “ groupiness” may result to reduce 
 uncertainty in interactions. In humans, common knowledge of  within-group  norms can 
further facilitate coordination on socially effi cient equilibriums and establish  coopera-
tion. Once groups are maintained and cooperate to produce and share resources, they 
become open to exploitation by other groups, which is directly relevant to the design of 
institutions.  Economic confl ict theory offers a potential framework for understanding 
and predicting exploitative behavior between groups. Through a better understanding 
of exploitation at these different levels, it is hoped that the payoffs of specifi c interac-
tions can be adjusted to reduce the negative impacts on a system.
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Introduction
 “ Social  parasitism” (e.g., Cote and Poulin 1995; Safi  and Kerth 2007),  cheating 
(e.g., Velicer et al. 2000; Sandoz et al. 2007), or  free riding (e.g., Hardin 1968) 
are all names for strategies by which agents benefi t from other agents’ invest-
ments. Our group was tasked with understanding the consequences of these 
exploitative strategies for individual behavior,  social structure, and design of 
 institutions.
The fi rst obstacle that we faced involved identifying and quantifying exploi-
tation. This is not trivial. Where individuals consistently invest differently in, 
or receive unequal rewards from, social interaction, counterstrategies tend to 
evolve which offset or mediate costs (Welbergen and Davies 2009; Kilner and 
Langmore 2011; Daugherty and Malik 2012). Thus, when we look at the out-
come of social interactions across time and contexts, it can be diffi cult to quan-
tify exploitation because individual behaviors and/or the social system have 
managed or mitigated it. In other words, there are often scenarios in which it is 
better for an agent to interact with those that exploit their efforts, or take more 
than their share, than not to interact with them and get none of the benefi ts of 
social interaction. Gaining some benefi t is better than getting no benefi t at all 
(West et al. 2006b, 2007c).
To overcome this barrier, we took a Hamiltonian1 approach (see Figure 
12.1) and quantifi ed four types of social interaction (Foster et al. 2001). First, 
it is useful to distinguish the individual who initiates an interaction from the 
individual or individuals that it infl uences (of course there are always conse-
quences for the initiator as well). The former is typically called the actor and 
the latter the recipient(s). Next, assuming that any consequences of actions can 
be either positive or negative, Hamilton derived a classifi cation scheme that 
enabled  social interactions to be classifi ed into four categories:
1.  Mutualism, if the consequences are positive for both actors and 
recipients
2.  Selfi shness, if the consequences are positive for the actor but negative 
for the recipient
3.  Altruism, if the consequences are negative for the actor but positive for 
the recipient
4.  Spite, if the consequences are negative for both parties (i.e., actors pay 
a cost to infl ict a cost on recipients)
The strict (original) classifi cation scheme for these four types of social interac-
tion envisages the consequences to lifetime  fi tness. Many evolutionary ecolo-
gists, however, prefer to think instantaneously about the consequences (i.e., 
accounted to some short-term proxy of fi tness like net rate of energy gain) 
1  William Hamilton (1936–2000) was an English evolutionary biologist, widely rec-
ognized as one of the most signifi cant evolutionary theorists of the twentieth century.
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for such interactions (Barta, this volume). Both views are relevant and ap-
plicable here. When juxtaposing the actions of different individuals toward 
each other in an interaction, mutualistic cooperation (mutual mutualism) can 
be distinguished from altruistic cooperation (mutual altruism). In a situation 
where mutual altruism is feasible (West et al. 2007b), we defi ne the term “ex-
ploitation” as benefi tting from the  altruism of another individual without tak-
ing an altruistic action. From the perspective of altruistic cooperation, such an 
action is selfi sh, since it increases an individual’s own payoff (or fi tness) at 
the cost of another’s payoff (or fi tness). Note that this defi nition encompasses 
the  producer–scrounger framework (Barnard and Sibly 1981; Vickery et al. 
1991), reviewed by Barta (this volume), as well as social dilemma games (e.g., 
 prisoner’s dilemma or  public goods games) that are studied in economics, re-
viewed by Burton-Chellew et al. (this volume). When there is no concurrent 
altruistic action taken by an individual (i.e., when  mutual  cooperation is not 
feasible), then a selfi sh action by an individual is not called “exploitative.” 
Exploitation is defi ned as benefi tting from the altruistic cooperation of others.
Now that we have defi ned selfi sh social actions that correspond to exploitation 
as broadly conceived, we can classify, compare, and contrast the consequences 
of these exploitative strategies for different levels of social organization. Each of 
these levels will be discussed in turn; for an overview, see Figure 12.2.
Consequences of Exploitation for Individual Behavior
Dubois  et al. (this volume) present a broad overview of the behavioral con-
sequences of exploitation and provide an excellent framework for investi-
gating how  hoarding (Andersson and Krebs 1978),  aggression (Manson and 
Wrangham 1991; Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995), and  coalition formation 
(Silk 1982) can be caused by the consequences of exploitation. Here, we fo-
cus on how the relative frequency of different types of social interactions that 
individuals experience (Figure 12.2) can play a critical role in their survival 
and reproduction. Specifi cally, how frequently and in which contexts an in-
dividual interacts with others, with either positive or negative outcomes, can 
infl uence the emergence and spread of cooperative behaviors (Gulati 1998; 
Ohtsuki et al. 2006),  social  learning (Franz and Nunn 2009; Hoppitt and Laland 
2011), and directly transmitted  diseases (Newman 2002; Keeling and Eames 





+  Mutualism  Selfi shness
– or 0 Altruism  Spite
Figure 12.1 Classifi cation of social actions, the consequences of which can be either 
positive or negative.
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behavioral connections that maximize the benefi ts and minimize the costs of 
sociality. In practice this will mean associating with certain individuals and 
avoiding others; functionally, this will act to reduce uncertainty in their social 
interactions (Aureli and Vanschaik 1991; Sueur et al. 2011; Farine et al. 2015). 
Consider a schooling fi sh, which might interact with thousands of other fi sh 
over the course of a day, but tends to form disproportionately close associa-
tions with others that are similar to itself in size or activity (Hoare et al. 2000a, 
b). This may confer increased protection from predators or improve social co-
ordination during migratory movements (Croft et al. 2009). Similarly, while a 
female baboon will live with many of the same troop mates from birth to death, 
she will tend to associate with baboons of similar competitive ability (King et 
al. 2009). This acts to reduce the potential for  confl ict and increase opportunity 
for cooperative interaction (King et al. 2008, 2011; King and Sueur 2011), and 
affects group-level phenotypic composition (Farine et al. 2015).
 Group phenotypic composition—or more precisely, the heterogeneity of 






Variation in strategies Intergroup relations
“Groupiness” in social interactions
?
Figure 12.2 Consequences  of exploitation for individual behavior,  social structure, 
and the design of institutions. (a) Individuals exhibit between-individual differences 
in strategy. These strategies need not be fi xed. For example, the “white” strategy could 
be to switch adaptively in accordance with the frequency of behaviors exhibited by the 
others. (b) Given that interacting individuals vary in their strategies, evolution should 
select for leaving or joining decision rules that either change group mean (and variance) 
in strategy or select for individual  plasticity in strategy. Both mechanisms function to 
change strategies to match ( homophily) or complement ( heterophily) the group. This 
acts to reduce uncertainty in strategy space, which in turn affects group-level outcomes 
(e.g., the total amount of food a group acquires). (c) As a result, between-group dif-
ferences in production and investment emerge, which can lead to intergroup confl icts. 
Note: populations can also be monomorphic for a strategy but still show individual 
differences in expressed tactics.
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and fi tness (Laskowski and Pruitt 2014; Farine et al. 2015). When  individual 
strategies are fi xed—individuals play pure producer or scrounger strategies 
(Giraldeau and Beauchamp 1999)—selection should result in the evolution of 
behaviors that will affect  heterogeneity of groups—leaving or joining decision 
rules, or forceful eviction of particular members from groups (Stephens et al. 
2005; Kerth et al. 2006; Kerth 2010). In contrast, if strategies are conditional 
(e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001) or plastic (Furtbauer et al. 2015) and can be 
modulated in response to the others—individuals can express varying levels of 
producing and  scrounging in different contexts (Morand-Ferron and Giraldeau 
2010)—we expect that selection acts to produce  plasticity in response to the 
social environment. This could lead to  social niche construction, whereby in-
dividuals alter their associations and interactions with others to increase their 
chances of surviving and reproducing (Flack et al. 2006; Laskowski and Pruitt 
2014; Farine et al. 2015).
Consequences of Exploitation for Social Structure: 
“Groupiness” and the Reduction of Uncertainty
Dubois et al. (this volume) review the consequences  of exploitation for the 
spatial structure of groups, with a particular focus on the  producer–scrounger 
game. Here, we focus on the consequences of exploitation for social struc-
ture (which may or may not be independent of spatial structures) and continue 
with the theme of fl exibility (or plasticity) in strategies using a recent study of 
producer–scrounger dynamics undertaken by one of our group (Kameda). In 
this study, people were tasked with fi nding “treasure” hidden in a 5 × 5 grid, 
and groups of individuals (N = 4) independently decided whether or not to 
“dig” in one of the grid areas for a treasure, paying some search cost. Each 
search decision is independent and without communication, so that  foragers 
cannot coordinate their search effort. Importantly, each group member bears 
the cost of search individually, but a treasure found will be shared evenly by 
all members. This setup can potentially yield a producer–scrounger situation 
(see Barta, this volume), where the group production function (i.e., the prob-
ability of the treasure to be found) increases monotonically with more coopera-
tors (searchers) but diminishes in margin, because searchers cannot coordinate 
with each other about where to search (at best, they can only pick up one spot 
randomly). With feedback about net payoffs and the number of searchers after 
each round, a phenotypic polymorphism of producers and scroungers emerges. 
In the fi rst ~33 rounds (except the fi rst round), the producer frequency distrib-
utes in a unimodal, almost symmetric distribution. From round ~67 to the end 
of the experiment (round 100), the distribution of producing across individuals 
becomes U shaped: roughly 30–40% committed scroungers never cooperate, 
20% committed producers almost always cooperate, and the remaining 30% 
are in-between. Kameda’s team then reassigned the subjects to new groups 
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as follows: the most cooperative players in each group were assigned to an 
“elite” group (the most cooperative team), the next most cooperative players 
into a second group, the third most cooperative players into a third group, and 
the least cooperative players into the fourth “delinquent” group. Then they 
played the game again. Although the average cooperation level (proportion 
of producing) was higher in the “elite” group than in the “delinquent” group, 
all newly formed groups showed a typical U-shaped distribution. This sug-
gests that the division of producer–scrounger roles in a group is not guided 
solely by stable  social preferences, but is (to some degree) plastic in response 
to the social environment and can emerge through repeated social interactions. 
The emergence of U-shaped distributions over time has also been observed 
in other types of collective tasks by human subjects (Kameda and Nakanishi 
2002; Kameda et al. 2011; Toyokawa et al. 2014) and is a necessary outcome 
where alternative tactics within a population depend on both their frequency 
and the phenotypes of individuals (Repka and Gross 1995; Gross 1996; Barta 
and Giraldeau 1998).
Reducing uncertainty in interactions can therefore be achieved by having 
fewer but more frequent interactions with a set of specifi c (known) individu-
als. Where individuals join and leave groups frequently and the system dis-
plays high fi ssion–fusion dynamics (Sueur et al. 2011), uncertainty reduction 
can be achieved via a signal or cue indicative of a particular individual strat-
egy (identity). For instance, in  Gouldian fi nches,  Erythrura gouldiae, which 
show two major head-color morphs (red and black), black-headed birds are 
bolder but less aggressive than red-headed birds (Williams et al. 2012). It has 
been hypothesized that these head color personality correlations may mini-
mize competitive interactions and facilitate cooperative interactions in groups 
(Williams et al. 2012; King et al. 2015). Similarly, in species ranging from ants 
to fi sh to mammals,  group identity can be mediated by olfactory cues (Zenuto 
and Fanjul 2002; Matsumura et al. 2007) and  shared  information transmission, 
including horizontal gene transfer (Ochman et al. 2000), and might be key to 
explaining the emergence of group identity and resulting  cooperative behavior. 
This is because associations (and thus likelihood of interactions) formed on 
the basis of such “group identities” or “strategy identities” can reduce the stra-
tegic uncertainty that any individual has to face. Work by Ehrhardt and Keser 
(1999) illustrates how this process may work. In their experiment with human 
subjects, individuals can endogenously select in which group they interact to 
play a  public goods game (i.e., a multiperson prisoner’s dilemma game). They 
found that cooperators try to be with cooperators, but  selfi sh persons (i.e., ex-
ploiters) are constantly chasing the cooperators, which leads to low stability in 
the groups and a high degree of uncertainty. In Ehrhardt and Keser’s setting, 
cooperators cannot prevent selfi sh people from joining their group (Charness 
et al. 2014). Thus, controlling group membership or getting individuals to 
comply with group-specifi c behavioral prescriptions (e.g.,  social norms) can 
be a means of preserving cooperation within the group.
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In the case of humans, who exhibit strategic behavior (i.e., take into account 
the strategic rationality of other players), the information structure which me-
diates the emergence of social norm compliance and  mutual  cooperation might 
take more complex forms. In particular, one of the main mechanisms enabling 
coordination on effi cient outcomes in social dilemmas has been shown to be 
conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al. 2001), which allows for an evolu-
tionary explanation (Mengel 2008). In this case, a stable cooperation can be 
achieved only if a given individual expects that others will also cooperate. With 
respect to  group identity, this requires coordination not only at the level of fi rst-
order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about whether oneself and other individuals belong 
to a group), but also at the level of second-order beliefs (whether others also 
believe that they belong to the group, and hence might comply with the group 
norms as well). Otherwise the cooperation of opposing individuals cannot be 
predicted in advance.
In game theoretic terms,  mutual  cooperation of conditional players (at least 
in humans) might therefore require common knowledge of group identity. A 
series of recent laboratory experiments confi rmed that common knowledge 
might be a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of cooperation and  proso-
cial behavior in human groups (thus, truly “activating” group identity), even 
with minimal group identity (Yamagishi and Mifune 2008; Guala et al. 2013; 
Ockenfels and Werner 2014). Complementing theoretical work, Gintis (2010) 
suggests that common knowledge of  within-group  norms might be interpreted 
as a purely signaling device, facilitating coordination on socially effi cient equi-
libria and hence self-suffi cient for establishing cooperation. Further research 
in  this direction is needed to shed light on the extent to which common knowl-
edge (or similar information structures) might explain the emergence and evo-
lution of real-life cooperation (Henrich et al. 2010).
Another important factor of stability of  cooperation within social groups 
is the perceived  fairness of internal group rules and procedures; for instance, 
with respect to the distribution of commonly produced outcome, individual 
autonomy, or  sanctions for  defectors (Hartner et al. 2008; Kosfeld et al. 2009; 
Gaechter and Thöni 2010). Various models suggest several key criteria for 
assessing fairness in strategic interactions (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton 
and Ockenfels 2000; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). At the same time, empirical 
evidence shows that both individuals and communities strongly vary in their 
perception of fairness (Henrich et al. 2010; Gelfand et al. 2011). This means 
that constructing a universal theory of fairness, taking into account its depen-
dence on the situational and institutional context (Henrich et al. 2010; Falk and 
Szech 2013), still remains an open area for research. In terms of  institutional 
design, a related question is how to reconcile and strengthen the perception of 
fairness within heterogeneous groups, which might again call for coordinating 
information structures such as common knowledge of group identity or shared 
contextual framing (Ellingsen et al. 2012).
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In addition to institutional design, there are both physical (Oliver 1993; 
King and Sueur 2011) and cognitive (Dunbar 2003; Dunbar and Shultz 2007) 
limits to maintaining identity in  groups, and the benefi ts of pooling efforts 
also diminishes in larger group sizes (King and Cowlishaw 2007). Laboratory 
experiments support this because norm enforcement  (e.g., through altruistic 
punishment of defectors) can be particularly strong in small groups (Henrich 
et al. 2010; Perc et al. 2013),  where a deviation from the group norm is rela-
tively more salient and, hence, more  detrimental for the overall group identity. 
Finally, large groups might be sensitive to the emergence of  opportunistic sub-
groups (characterized by cooperation within the subgroup) but, at the same 
time, exploit the total group outcome (for further discussion, see Foster et al., 
this volume). These seemingly contradictory behaviors (prosocial with respect 
to the subgroup but opportunistic with respect to the whole group) suggest fur-
ther that intra-(sub)group cooperation might be largely viewed as a pragmatic 
method of coordination on an effi cient outcome, rather than a revelation of 
altruistic preferences (Guala et al. 2013).
Consequences of Exploitation for Institutions: Intergroup 
Relations and Economic Confl ict Theory
Once groups  are maintained and cooperate to produce and share resources, 
they may become open to exploitation by other groups. Foster et al. (this vol-
ume) explore the challenges for market and institutional design when counter-
ing exploitation strategies. Here, we take a look at  economic  confl ict theory 
(ECT) (Hirshleifer 1989, 1991; Skaperdas 1996), which we believe holds 
much promise for exploring exploitative behavior between groups. The idea 
behind ECT is to treat appropriative and/or defensive actions as economic ac-
tivities in their own right. ECT assumes the absence of well-defi ned property 
rights in resources and goods in a state of anarchy, which makes expropriation 
of other owners of resources or goods (through force or otherwise) a viable al-
ternative to own production. Hence there is a trade-off in resource use between 
productive and appropriative measures. This view goes beyond the scenario of 
 producer–scrounger or  hawk–dove games developed in evolutionary biology 
(see Dubois et al. and Burton-Chellew et al., this volume). These games allow 
for a dichotomous (extreme) set of actions, but ECT is very applicable to evo-
lutionary analysis with minimal conceptual tweaking.
ECT assumes that two economic agents (which can be individuals, groups, 
or populations) can combine their resources, R1 and R2, in a productive effort 
to create an additional surplus (consumption good). Evolutionary biologists 
would refer to this as a  public/communal good, and hawk–dove analysis as-
sumes such a communally available resource exists a priori. The two agents 
then have to agree on a division of this surplus. Although their preferences are 
aligned with regard to the production of the additional surplus (both prefer 
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cooperation), they are diametrically opposed with respect to its distribution 
(each prefers more over less). In the standard economic model with well-
established  property rights (which, moreover, can be enforced at no cost), 
rational individuals would peacefully agree on a division through some bar-
gaining procedure, or through a contract that is specifi ed in advance, which is 
assumed to be enforceable. However, in a state of anarchy without established 
 property rights, the same rational agents would dispute the produced good once 
it is produced. This provides the rationale to invest part of the resources into 
“weapons,” which increase the likelihood of success in any ensuing confl ict 
over the produced goods. The marginal return on an additional unit of resource 
invested into weapons is measured by the additional expected winnings from 
the contest over the produced good. This is smaller now, since one less unit of 
resources is used in its production, but the probability of winning this smaller 
“pie” has increased for the investing player. The marginal cost of this addi-
tional investment is given by the individual after-fi ght share of the amount of 
the good that could have been produced; the latter depends on the productivity 
of the investing agent. Obviously, the fi rst option—no one invests in  weapons 
and all resources go toward the production of the good—is not an equilibrium.
A confl ict technology (contest success function) transforms the investments 
in weapons made by both players into winning probabilities for both players 
(Hirshleifer 1989). If neither player invests, a fair division is assumed; invest-
ment by only one player leads to a winning probability of “1” for this player. 
When both players increase their investments into weapons, the amount of 
resources invested in the production of the good decreases. Symmetric players 
(i.e., those with identical amounts of the resource and identical productivity) 
will invest the same amount of resources into weapons. Hence both players 
win the contest over the produced good with probability 1/2. If R1 > R2, this 
result still applies. Hirshleifer (1989, 1991) coined this the  paradox of power: 
a poorer agent turns out to be equally powerful in the contest over the produced 
good. This paradox becomes more pronounced if the agents also differ in pro-
ductivity for the good: the more productive player invests always less into 
weapons in equilibrium than the less productive one. Hence, the less produc-
tive agent will be more powerful in the contest for the produced good and will 
achieve a higher payoff in equilibrium. Whereas the more productive agent 
enjoys a comparative advantage in production, the less productive one has the 
advantage in fi ghting. This means that productiveness is inversely related to 
power, which is opposite to the case of secure property rights. Moreover, more 
effective weapons lead to more investments into weapons, and hence lower 
production and material welfare. Generalizations of this model are provided 
by Skaperdas (1996) and Hwang (2009).
A slightly more elaborate model allows for the peaceful settlement of the 
contest over the produced product (Garfi nkel and Skaperdas 2006). Suppose 
that after both agents have invested into weapons and production they bar-
gain over the division of the output. If an agreement is reached at this stage, 
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both agents share the good accordingly and the game ends. If no agreement is 
reached, both agents fi ght it out with their weapons in a third stage. It is pos-
sible to reach agreement at the second stage in the shadow of the confl ict that 
looms ahead (at the third stage). Thus investment into weapons now serves 
the purpose of gaining an advantageous bargaining position. Clearly, in the 
bargaining solution, each player must at least receive the amount he can expect 
from the confl ict. The exact division depends on the used bargaining proce-
dure, which also infl uences investments into weapons.
This model has been adapted to production and confl ict between groups 
(see, e.g., Skaperdas 1998; Wärneryd 1998). Although it is not immediately 
obvious to us where ECT may apply biologically to a particular species or 
context, we expect that the same sort of confl ict could manifest in life history 
trade-offs where (say) growing  weaponry (or musculature) will diminish the 
resources available for effort into activities that can produce something that 
is potentially shareable (Isbell 1991; Berglund et al. 1996). On a longer term, 
the inverse relationship between productiveness and power, as set out by ECT, 
gives  disincentives to productive  innovations and hence stalls growth.
Conclusion
We have managed to go through this chapter with only limited reference to 
game theoretical models. Mengel and van der Weele, Burton-Chellew et al., 
and Barta (this volume) provide full details and examples of how these models 
can be used to understand exploitative strategies. This does not mean that we 
dismiss this approach; rather the opposite. Research in exploitation by both 
economists and biologists is related directly or indirectly to the use of game 
theoretical models. We believe that regular movement back and forth between 
these models, experimental data, and statistical fi tting are necessary to begin 
to understand how and why exploitation occurs in different biological systems. 
Systematically classifying any biological system through the use of models 
may allow us to reverse engineer the key ingredients. Then we may be in a 
position to manipulate the payoffs and reduce exploitation where this impacts 
negatively on a system.
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